With the improvement of awareness of data privacy, the user's sensitive data are usually encrypted before uploading them to cloud. Searchable encryption is a critical technique on promoting secure and efficient cloud storage. In particular, publickey encryption with keyword search (PEKS) provides an elegant approach to achieve data retrieval in encrypted storage. All existing searchable publickey encryption schemes only provide the security based on classical cryptography hardness assumption. With the development of
Introduction
Cloud storage service offers great convenience to users. Users remotely outsource their data to the cloud so as to enjoy the on-demand high-quality services from a shared pool of configurable computing resources with low cost. To protect data privacy, users have to encrypt the sensitive data before uploading to clouds. However, the simple encryption of the data makes the data utilisation (such as data retrieval) a very challenging task in the cloud.
If users access the data they stored by downloading all the data set first then searching over the decrypted, this requires high consumption of bandwidth and deviates original intention. If they submit the keys to the cloud, the data confidentiality will be lost.
The searchable encryption (Song, Wagner and Perrig, 2000) allows the cloud server to search over encrypted data without decryption, which was first introduced by Song et al. (2000) . It does not leak any information about the data and query. Therefore, searchable encryption is a critical technique promoting efficient and secure cloud storage.
The searchable encryption has been developed into two different types. The first type is the symmetric searchable encryption (SSE in short) scheme. The SSE schemes require that a sender is securely granted a secret key from the intended receiver. They suffer from risks of key leakage in management and distribution (Song, Wagner and Perrig, 2000) . The second type is the searchable public-key encryption scheme with keyword search (PEKS in short), which allows any one seeing the receiver's public key to encrypt documents.
The PEKS provides an efficient mechanism to achieve data retrieval in encrypted storage. In a PEKS scheme, the sender generates the searchable ciphertext of a keyword with receiver's public key and stores it to the server. To retrieve the encrypted data associated with a given keyword, the receiver creates a search request (trapdoor) using the keyword and his private key. After receiving a trapdoor, the cloud server performs a test to see whether there are any encrypted data matching the trapdoor and return corresponding encrypted data to the receiver.
The first searchable public-key encryption scheme with keyword search (Boneh and Boyen, 2004) was proposed by Boneh et al. (2004) . In Boneh et al.' s scheme, the secure channel is required to protect the trapdoors in the transport channel. Since building a secure channel is usually expensive, this requirement limits applications of the searchable public-key encryption scheme. To overcome this obstacle, in 2008, Baek et al. proposed secure channel-free public-key encryption scheme with keyword search (Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo, 2008 ) (SCF-PEKS in short), which removes the secure channel requirement.
Nevertheless, Yau et al. (2008) showed that this scheme is insecure for the following reason. With outside keyword-guessing attacks (outside KGAs), an outside adversary can reveal encrypted keywords, if he obtains a trapdoor in channel. To resist this threat, in (Rhee et al., 2010) , a searchable public-key encryption scheme with a designated tester (dPEKS in short) is proposed. In their scheme, only a designated server can test whether given trapdoor matches the ciphertexts.
Afterwards, a variety of PEKS schemes (Xu et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2009; Gu and Zhu, 2010; Jeong et al., 2009; Liu, Wang and Wu, 2009; Rhee, Susilo and Kim, 2009; Chen, Chen and Li, 2014; Liu et al., 2015; Zhu and Yang, 2015; Hu, Yang and Liu, 2015; Yu et al., 2014; Hu and Liu, 2011; Zhao et al., 2012) were proposed with different functionalities and levels of efficiency. Many of the searchable public-key encryption schemes pay more attention to improving the security against outside KGA (Xu et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2009; Gu and Zhu, 2010; Jeong et al., 2009; Liu, Wang and Wu, 2009; Rhee, Susilo and Kim, 2009) . Only a few schemes (Hu and Liu, 2011; Zhao et al., 2012; Fang et al., 2013; Rhee et al., 2010) can effectively resist outside KGA. Furthermore, all the existing dPEKS schemes only provide the security based on classical cryptography hardness assumption. With the development of quantum computers and enhance cloudcomputing power, these schemes will suffer serious security threats. A natural goal is to find the new solutions that are secure even if quantum computers are ever developed.
Fortunately, the situation has changed with lattice-based cryptography appearance. Currently, lattice-based cryptography is considered as the most promising options for post-quantum cryptography. In addition, it enjoys the benefits of provable security under worst-case hardness assumptions, asymptotic efficiency. Therefore, it is a significant research work to design strong secure (stand against outside KGA) and lattice-based dPEKS.
Our contributions
Motivated by the issue discussion above, we construct a new searchable public-key encryption scheme with a designated tester (dPEKS). Our contributions are summarised as follows:
• First, our scheme is first lattice-based searchable public-key encryption scheme with a designated tester. It enjoys provable security under LWE hardness assumption, asymptotic efficiency, especially security against quantum computers. Since our scheme is constructed over lattice, it is usually required only linear operations on small integers, while the existing dPEKS are required pairing operations and exponentiation. Therefore, our scheme is the promising candidate for the traditional schemes.
• Second, our scheme achieves the trapdoor indistinguishability. The trapdoors indistinguishability implies the security against off-line KGA from outside attacks. Until now, very few schemes can resist outside off-line KGA. According to (Fang et al., 2013) , in Boneh et al.'s original framework, it is not possible to construct a dPEKS scheme secure against inside (server) KGA. In this sense, our scheme provides the strongest security level.
• Last, our scheme can achieve the trapdoor anonymity for server.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first review the definition of dPEKS and its security model which is defined in Rhee et al. (2010) . Meanwhile, we also review the related notions of lattice, the sampling technique from lattice and the LWE assumption. At the end, we review a lattice-based IBE scheme (Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan, 2008) which is the main building block to construct our scheme.
Definition of dPEKS and security model 2.1.1 Definition of dPEKS
As stated in Rhee et al. (2010) , a dPEKS scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1 A dPEKS scheme consists of the following four PPT (probability polynomial-time) algorithms (GlobalSetup, KeyGen, dPEKS, dTrapdoor, dTest). In the sequel, CP denotes a set of common parameters.
• GlobalSetup (n): Taking as input security parameter n, this algorithm outputs a set of common parameters CP.
• KeyGen (CP): Taking as input CP, this algorithm outputs the receivers a public/private key pair (PK r , SK r ) and the servers a public/private key pair (PK s , SK s ).
• dPEKS (CP, PK r , PK s , w): Taking as input CP, the receiver's public key PK r , the server's public key PK s and a keyword w, this algorithm outputs a dPEKS ciphertext CT w corresponding to w.
• dTrapdoor (CP, PK s , SK r , PK r , w): Taking as input a receiver's public/private key (PK r , SK r ), the server's public key PK s and a keyword w, this algorithm outputs the trapdoor T w of w. 
Security model of dPEKS

Security of dPEKS ciphertext
In this security model, the dPEKS ciphertexts (an encrypted list of keywords) should satisfy indistinguishability against a chosen plaintext attack (C-IND-CPA in short). According to Rhee et al. (2010) , the C-IND-CPA guarantees that 1 A server cannot distinguish between the dPEKS ciphertexts of two challenge keywords w 0 and w 1 its choice, if he has not obtained their trapdoor.
2 An outside adversary (including a receiver) who can generate the trapdoors of any keyword (excluding challenge keywords) cannot distinguish between the dPEKS ciphertexts of w 0 and w 1 its choice, if he has not obtained the server's private key.
Let 1 F and 2 F be a malicious server and an outside adversary, respectively. The C-IND-CPA can be defined with the following two games.
Game1
Here, G is a challenger and 1 F is a malicious server.
• Setup: 1 F generates (PK s , SK s ) as his public/private key pair. G generates (PK r , SK r ) as receiver's public/private key pair. Next, the tuples (PK s , SK s , PK r ) are given to 1 F , and the tuples (PK r , SK r , PK s ) are given to G .
• Phase 1 Trapdoor queries: 1 F queries many keywords * {0,1} w∈ to obtain their trapdoors T w . G can adaptively asks T w = dTrapdoor(PK s , SK r , w) for any keyword * {0,1} w∈ and returns T w to 1 F , where dTrapdoor is the trapdoor generation oracle.
• Challenge: 1 F chooses the keyword pair (w 0 , w 1 ) as his challenge. Here, the restriction is that w 0 and w 1 have not been queried to obtain the trapdoors • Phase 2 Trapdoor queries: 1 F can still query w to obtain its trapdoor as phase 1. If the 0 1 , w w w ≠ , G adaptively responses 1 F with T w as phase 1.
• Outputs: 1 F outputs its guess
denote the advantage probability that 1 F wins the Game1.
Game2
Here, G is a challenger and 2 F an outside adversary (including a malicious receiver).
• Setup: 2 F generates (PK r , SK r ) as his public/private key pair. G generates (PK s , SK s ) as his public/private key pair. The tuples (PK r , SK r , PK s ) are given to 2 F , the tuples (PK s , SK s , PK r ) are given to G . Here, 2 F can generate the trapdoor of any keyword since he holds SK r .
• Challenge: 2 F chooses the keyword pair (w 0 , w 1 ) as his challenge. Here, the restrictions is that 2 F did not previously ask the dTest oracle for the trapdoors of w 0 and w 1 . Receiving w 0 and w 1 , G chooses
denote the advantage probability that 2 F wins the Game2.
Definition 2.2 For any polynomial-time attackers 1 F and 2 F , we say that a dPEKS scheme satisfies dPEKS indistinguishability against an adaptive chosen plaintext attack,
Security of trapdoor
According to Rhee et al. (2010) , the trapdoor indistinguishability (T-IND-CPA) requires that an adversary (excluding the receiver and the server) should not be able to distinguish between the trapdoors of two challenge keywords, w 0 and w 1 , where w 0 and w 1 are chosen by the adversary. Let 3 F denote an outside adversary, the security of trapdoor is defined with the following Game3.
Game3 G is a challenger and 3 F is an outside adversary.
• Setup: Running GlobalSetup and KeyGen, the common parameter CP, the receiver's key pair (PK r , SK r ) and the server's key pair (PK s , SK s ) are generated. CP, PK r and PK s are given to 3 F , while SK s and SK r are kept secret from 3 F . . G adaptively answers 3 F as Phase 1.
• Outputs: 3 F outputs its guess
denote the advantage probability of 3 F wins the Game3.
Definition 2.3 For any polynomial-time 3 F , we say that a dPEKS scheme satisfies
Lattice and lattice-based IBE scheme
In this section, we first review the related notions and the complexity assumptions, and then provide the definition of the lattice-based IBE scheme.
Statistical distance
Given two random variables 1 D and 2 D over the finite set S, the statistical distance between 1 D and 2 D is defined as (Micciancio and Goldwasser, 2012) . For t n = , ( ) L A is called full-rank n-dimensional integer lattice. In addition, let ( ) A, d) , where d a rational number. In YES
According to the result of Ajtai (1999) , there is the trapdoor basis generate algorithm on lattice (TrapGen in short). Namely, there is the following lemma (Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan, 2008) . Lemma 2.1 For any prime q=ploy(n) and 5 m nlgq ≥ , there exists an efficient PPT (probabilistic polynomial-time) algorithm that, on input 1 n , outputs a , whenever ( ) q L u A is not empty.
Learning with errors
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced in Micciancio and Goldwasser (2012) . Given security parameters n, a prime q(n) and a distribution χ over q Z , then for a uniform vector and GapSVP is showed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1 (Regev, 2005) For ( ) (0,1) n α ∈ and a prime q(n) such that q> 2 n α , assume there is an efficient algorithm (possibly quantum) that solves (n, χ , q Z ,)-LWE problem, then there exists an efficient algorithm (quantum) that approximates the GapSVP and SIVP problems, to within ( ) O n α in the worst case.
Putting the above together, if LWE is hard, then the distributions Remark: Usually, a LWE instance simple refers to + a s x since the vector a is uniform random.
In addition, to show that our scheme works correctly, the following lemma (Agrawal, Boneh and Boyen, 2010) will be required. Identity-based encryption (IBE) is a useful tool to construct a searchable public-key encryption scheme. Recently, some IBE schemes (Li and Zhang, 2013; Luo and Chen, 2014; Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan, 2008) were proposed. Based on the latticebased IBE (Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan, 2008) , we give a searchable public-key encryption scheme. Now, we first review this lattice-based IBE scheme. 
Lemma 2.3 Let
Identity-based encryption
Lattice-based dPEKS
In this section, we construct a lattice-based searchable public-key encryption scheme with a designated tester (dPEKS). According to the model of Section 2, our scheme is described as follows. Here, all operations are performed over q Z and let α χ = Ψ .
• Setup (n): Let n be the natural security parameter. Let m O = (nlogq) and q O = ( 2 n ) be some positive integers. Let is defined as follows.
2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 is defined as follows. 
Correctness and security
Correctness
In this section, we prove that our scheme is correct. Proof: According to the security model of Section 2, our proof is divided into two parts. In the first, let the polynomial-time adversary 1 F be the malicious server. In the second, let the polynomial-time adversary 2 F be an outside adversary (including receiver). Let G denote a simulator.
The First Part If 1 F can break our scheme with an advantage probability 1 ε , then we construct a simulator G which can solve the decision LWE problem with the advantage probability 1 ε . CT , 1 F can still inquiry the trapdoor of w, as long as w ≠ w 0 , w 1 . G answers 1 F as Phase 1 by asking the dTrapdoor oracle.
• Guess: Finally, 1 F output guesses b'. If b'=b, G outputs 1 (indicating that ,χ z A is selected from challenge); otherwise, it outputs 0.
Probability Analysis If
,χ z A is selected, the simulation is perfect, and 1 F will guess the bits b correctly with probability 1 1 2 ε + . Else, 1 2 + w U s u is a uniformly random vector. 1 F will guess the bits b correctly with probability 1 2 . Therefore, G can distinguish between ,χ z A and u with advantage probability The Second Part If 2 F can break our scheme with an advantage probability 2 ε , then we Guess: Finally, 2 F outputs guesses b'. If ′ = b b , G outputs 1 (indicating that ,χ z A is selected from challenge); otherwise, it outputs 0. Probability Analysis: Based on the same reasons as the first part, G can distinguish between ,χ z A and u with advantage probability 2 2 1 1 ( ) 2 2 ε ε + − = .
This completes the proof of dPEKS ciphertexts indistinguishability.
Security of trapdoor
In this section, we show that our scheme achieves the trapdoor indistinguishability for any outside adversary (excluding server and receiver). Proof: Suppose there exists an adversary 3 F breaking the trapdoor indistinguishability of our scheme with advantage probability 3 ε , then we construct a simulator G which can solve decision LWE problem with the advantage probability 3 ε . Here, 3 scheme enjoys provable security under LWE assumption. How to design the lattice-based dPEKS scheme that can stand against inside KGAs is an important work in the future.
